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Specific Performance of a Building Contract
Affirmed by a Court of Equity
Courts of equity, in American jurisdictions, have long fol-
lowed the principle that specific performance of a contract will
not be decreed, if the performance is of such a character as to
make effective enforcement unreasonably difficult, or will require
long and continued supervision by the court.1 Yet, in a recent
4 to 3 decision of the New York Court of Appeals this principle
was ignored.2
In the instant case a landowner was developing a shopping
center on Long Island and agreed to construct a department
store for the respondent. Because of the "tight mortgage money
market," he had difficulty in securing funds for the proposed
building and, therefore, defaulted on the contract. In accordance
with the terms of the contract, respondent initiated arbitration
proceedings before the American Arbitration Association. The
arbitrators awarded specific performance. In affirming the arbitra-
tion award, the majority relied upon two principles.
The first principle employed, was that even though a court of
equity may not have granted specific performance of the contract
in an original action; nevertheless, it has long been the policy of
the courts to affirm and enforce an arbitration award where it is
found that the parties to the contract have either expressly or
impliedly agreed that such a remedy shall be available or have
stipulated that any just or equitable relief may be granted3 In
this case the parties had agreed to such relief, since, under the
rules of the American Arbitration Association, the arbitrator is
IIRESTATEMENT, CONTRACrS, § 371 (1932).
2Grayson-Robinson Stores v. Iris Construction Co., 8 N.Y. 2d 133, 168 N.E.
2d 377 (1960).
3Ruppert v. Egelhoffer, 3 N.Y. 2d 576, 148 N.E. 2d 129 (1958); Staklinski
v. Pyramid Electric Co., 6 N.Y. 2d 159, 160 N.E. 2d 78 (1959); in re
Albert, 160 Misc. 237, 288 N.Y.S. 933 (1936); Pocketbook Workers
Union v. Central Leather Goods Corp., 14 Misc. 2d 268, 149 N.Y.S. 2d
56 (1956); Freyberg Bros. Inc. v. Corey, 177 Misc. 560, 31 N.Y.S. 2d
10 (1944).
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empowered in his award to grant any just or equitable remedy
or relief, including specific performance.
The second principle relied upon was that under the New
York Civil Practice Act, Article 84, it is stated that when arbitra-
tion is consented to by the parties, then those who agree to
arbitrate should be made to abide by their solemn promises.4 It
was further stated that the courts should follow a liberal policy
in confirming arbitration awards which follow the original in-
tentions of the parties. The courts feel that by doing so, it will
ease the current congestion of the court calendars.5
Careful note should be taken of the dissenting opinion in
the Grayson-Robinson case:
The decision in the present case lends the enforcement
machinery of the courts, to implement specific performance
directed by arbitration that extends beyond any equitable
relief which the courts have heretofore granted either on
arbitrations or after trials.6
By stating that the courts have traditionally denied specific per-
formance in cases where elaborate and time-consuming building
construction must be performed, the dissenting opinion follows
the generally accepted rule.'
Justice Van Voorhis, dissenting, continued by stating:
The record before us indicates that the appellant applied un-
successfully to 27 different lending firms in order to obtain
the necessary mortgage money with which to erect this
building. Petitioners appear to recognize that for this reason
the buiding may not be constructed even after the entry of
the order for specific performance.8
4New York Civil Practice Act, Article 84, § 1450.
5Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, 271 F. 2d 402, 410 (2d Cir. 1959).
68 N.Y. 2d 133, 139 (1960).
7Beck v. Allison, 56 N.Y. 366 (1874); Standard Fashion Co. v. Siegel-Cooper
Co., 157 N.Y. 60, 51 N.E. 408 (1898); McCormick v. Proprietors of
Cemetery of Mt. Auburn, 285 Mass. 548, 189 N.E. 585 (1934); Jones
v. Parker, 163 Mass. 564, 40 N.E. 1044 (1894); RESTATEMENT,
CONTRACTS, § 371 (1932).
B8 N.Y. 2d 133, 143 (1960).
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RECENT CASES
According to the dissenting opinion, the court should remand
the case to the arbitrators and recommend that damages be
awarded.
The decision in this case has put arbitration in a position
whereby it has become not merely a step in the judicial process,
but an end within itself. The majority opinion infers that had the
suit been originally brought before the court, it would have
awarded damages instead of a decree of specific performance, but
since the matter had already been arbitrated by the agreement of
the parties, the award given should be affirmed. In doing so, the
court placed itself in a position of having to supervise the re-
sponden's actions in order to ascertain that he performs the
contract properly.
If the decision of the court is followed (as it most likely will
be) the court will defeat the very reason for this decision. By
stating that arbitration awards should be enforced in order to clear
the calendar, the court has placed expediency first and justice
second. It has put contracting parties in such a position that if
they desire to arbitrate any matter, they must be bound by the
arbitrator's award, whether it is just or not. Because of this it
is more than likely that many future contracts will not include
a provision for arbitration. Consequently all differences, whether
large or small, will be settled in court. If such a policy is followed
it is almost certain that there will be an increase in the amount
of litigation before the courts. Even in contracts where there is
an arbitration provision, if the court continues to allow arbitra-
tors to award a decree of specific performance, when such per-
formance is impossible, as they have in this case, the contracting
parties will find themselves in no better position than before.
Since the performance of the contract is impossible, the appellant
will be forced to seek damages. Hence, instead of an expedient
settlement of this case, litigation has been prolonged.
M. P. Y.
